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Historically the Rohingyas are a religious-
ethnic community residing in Myanmar. 
However, since the 1970s the then military 
regime of the predominantly Buddhist state 
decided to contest the citizenship status of 
this marginalised Muslim minority which 
resulted in their persecution and expulsion 
to neighbouring countries. The huge 
number of refugees created complex 
challenges and threat perceptions for the 
whole region but especially for neighbouring 
Bangladesh. Due to the reluctance of the 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB) to grant 
the Rohingyas refugee status only a 
minority of them live in official refugee 
camps; to date the bulk (more than 
500,000) of the Rohingyas are living in 
unregistered camps. The most directly 
affected region is the Chittagong Division in 
the country’s South-East Border Area which 
is located in the immediate neighbourhood 
of Myanmar’s Rakhine province, where the 
Rohingyas originally settled. It is important 
to maintain notice of the fact that the 
Chittagong Division is of extraordinary 
strategic importance for the GoB. Not only 
the country primary seaport but also the 
country’s growing tourist industry (especially 
the coastal area of Cox Bazar) is located 
there. Furthermore, the fact that the stability 
of the border area is crucial for various 
major infrastructure projects (rail, roads, 
and bridges) in order to connect the country 
with China and South East Asia makes 
Dhaka’s decision-maker highly sensitive 
towards any challenges on the safety and 
security situation in the South East.  
Having this in mind, the massive influx of 
the Rohingyas during the last decades 
creates a multidimensional security 
scenario. As stateless refugees they face, 
as objects of security threats, various forms 
of psycho-social and human security 
challenges, in Myanmar and in their new 
host countries as Bangladesh. Even those 
able to migrate into Bangladesh, those not 
residing in officially registered camps live in 
extraordinarily deplorable conditions. Due to 
their ‘involuntarily’, illegal self-settlement 
they have to deal with the regular security 
forces, unease and resistance of local 
communities, much limited access to food, 
drinking water, sufficient shelter and 
clothing, and are getting easily targeted by 
criminal networks, illegal businesses, and 
Islamic fundamentalist groups. 
 
In addition to being the object of security 
threats, the Rohingyas are also perceived 
as subjects of a security peril, meaning that 
the Rohingyas themselves as a group 
constitute a security threat for Bangladesh’s 
state and society. In other words, the 
imbroglio of the Rohingya refugees in 
Bangladesh is not only the logical 
consequence of the dramatic security 
conditions in neighbouring Myanmar, but 
also perceived as the cause for conflicts in 
the host country with remarkable 
transnational spill-over effects. The latter 
has impacts in different domestic spheres of 
public life especially with social, economic, 
environmental political and military aspects. 
Furthermore, the Rohingyas are also 
4 
increasingly classified as a burden to 
relations between the countries in the 
region. However, through both (subjective 
and objective) lenses it became clear that 
there is an increasing trend among analysts 
in Bangladesh and beyond to perceive the 
Rohingyas issue not only solely as a 
humanitarian and refugee issue. Rather 
they identify the refugees increasingly as a 
so-called ‘non-traditional security threat’ 
because of following reasons:  
 
First, the Rohingyas conundrum has to be 
seen in the context of the rising challenge in 
Bangladesh of controlling Islamic terrorism 
and political Islam. Basically, one can find 
following rationale: the Rohingyas problem 
is contributing to and is partly responsible 
for the rise of the religious fundamentalist 
movement in the country. In more 
operational terms, there is the claim that the 
Rohingyas are helping to supporting 
religious fundamentalism in two ways: in an 
indirect, passive way and in a direct, active 
one.  
Indirectly, the Rohingyas are serving as a 
(passive) recruiting base for Islamic militant 
extremists. There are obvious indications 
that several organised interest groups of the 
refugees maintain links with domestically 
and internationally operating religious 
extremist and terrorist organisation. The 
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), for 
example, is accused of having formed 
partnerships with Al-Qaeda and Jammaat-e-
Islami among others. Also the interaction 
with the radicalised Saudi Arabia-based 
charity organisation Rabita-al-Alam-al-
Islami moved the RSO into the global 
stream of Islamic fundamentalism.  
The direct support for religious 
fundamentalism by Rohingyas finds its 
expression in the claim that some 
radicalized sections of the refugees are 
actively maintaining links with banned 
Islamist groupings like Jama'atul 
Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat-ul-
Jihad-al Islami (Huji). Here it is important to 
recognize that the radicalized Rohingyas 
are not only sympathising with their 
fundamentalist worldview but also actively 
providing these Islamist outfits, for example 
with providing training on arms and 
explosives. Additionally, there is the 
accusation that the Rohingyas are using 
their international network to allocate funds 
from like-minded organisations for militant 
organizations operating in Bangladesh. 
 
In this context, it is important to be aware 
that there are further claims of the 
involvement of state actors in providing 
weapon training in Rohingyas camps in the 
Bangladesh-Myanmar border region. It is 
stated that the goal was to increase the 
ability of militant sections among the 
(Rohingyas) refugees to defend 
themselves. Furthermore, the notion was 
spread that the same militants should be 
enabled to carry out counterattacks on 
perpetrators of violence and human rights 
abuses against the Rohingyas community. 
There are also accusations that foreign 
(non-Bangladeshi) intelligence is involved in 
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this process, but not sufficient in evidence 
yet. Nevertheless, most of these kinds of 
action obviously originated from the notion 
of the necessity of potential operation within 
Myanmar’s border. However, despite the 
fact that it is difficult to prove to which extent 
Islamic fundamentalist groups are getting 
supported by the Rohingyas on 
Bangladeshi soil or how far foreign and 
domestic state actors (such as intelligence 
agencies) supporting the Rohingyas the 
accusation of this phenomenon remains 
quite resilient. Furthermore, it seems also 
hard to identify terrorist activities of 
Bangladesh based Rohingyas militants, 
operating in neighbouring Myanmar and 
India. Nevertheless, there are no doubts 
that radicalized and militant Rohingyas are 
actively promoting the course of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Bangladesh. In this 
context, the refugees are challenging the 
democratic framework as well as the 
notions of democracy and tolerance. 
 
Second, Rohingyas are made responsible 
for the undermining of the general law and 
order situation in their host societies. 
Besides terrorism, extremist violence and 
religious extremism, the Rohingyas crisis is 
also associated with all kinds of trafficking 
and other criminal activities including 
narcotics, human, SALW (small arms and 
light weapons), ammunition, stealing, armed 
robbery, and maritime piracy. Other major 
concerns are smuggling and illegal cross-
border infiltrations. Additionally, Rohingyas 
are increasingly linked with growing rates of 
crimes related to extortion, sexual 
harassment (including prostitution and 
sexual slavery), killings for organs, domestic 
servitude, and forced labour. There is the 
tendency to ignore the fact that mostly 
Rohingyas are not the perpetrators. Rather, 
it seems that the general awareness is 
focusing on the presence of the refugees as 
the causal factor for upward appearance of 
misdeeds. However, here as well as in all 
other facets of the perceptions of the 
Rohingyas challenge, one has to point out 
that the contours of being subject or object 
of security threat are quite fluent. In other 
words, some sections of the Rohingyas 
must be perceived not only as victims but 
also as multipliers of crimes. Nevertheless, 
it is apparent that the refugee camps 
Nayapara (subdistrict Teknaf) and 
Kutupalang (subdistrict Ukhia) in the district 
Cox’s Bazar Sadar have high rates of crime. 
Consequently, they often become 
remarkably violent places with spill-over 
effects into surrounding local communities 
in the district of Cox's Bazar. This is 
increasing the level of frustration and threat 
perception among local communities and 
Rohingyas and subsequently seriously 
undermining a constructive dialogue 
between both sides. 
 
Third, as already indicated there is also a 
strong economic dimension in the 
Rohingyas threat perception attached. The 
Rohingyas are identified by GoB and local 
communities as a significant disturbing 
factor in the economic development of the 
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South East border region due to various 
reasons: First, the Rohingyas constitute an 
additional demographic pressure on the 
already densely populated area with is 
scarce resources. Second, the (mostly 
illegal) penetration of the refugees in the 
regional job market leads to further socio-
economic inequalities and distortions 
regarding employment opportunities for the 
local workforce (by providing cheap labour). 
Third, there is an increasing awareness 
about a potential ecological crisis allegedly 
caused by the Rohingyas. More concrete, 
the extensive use of the natural resources, 
especially the forest like the one of the 
Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary. The exploitation 
of firewood and deforestations for 
settlements causes severe forest 
destruction in protected areas. Fourth, there 
is also the claim that due to instability and 
consequent security measures because of 
the refugee problem is seriously leading to 
a reduction in trade and commerce. In this 
context, Rohingyas are also blamed for the 
delay in project to enhance regional 
connectivity (infrastructure) since it is 
hampering the working relationship between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar.  
 
Fourth, the Rohingyas are classified as a 
challenge towards the political-
administrative institutional structure of 
Bangladesh. Three examples are 
noteworthy in order to outline the 
unfortunate nexus of hosting state and 
refugees, namely the impact of the 
Rohingyas crisis on the country’s civil-
military relations, the implementation of 
Rohingyas in the voters list, and the 
refugees as catalysers of corruption.   
Bangladesh is a country, which has had 
unhealthy civil-military relations ever since 
gaining independence in 1971. The 
experience of two military rules (Ziaur 
Rahman 1975-81, Hussain M. Ershad 1982-
90) as well as an extra-constitutional 
military-backed caretaker government 
(2006-2008) must be seen as hint for a 
traditional lack of civilian control over the 
armed forces in Bangladesh. This is 
significant, since due to the deficiencies of 
the country’s governance architecture the 
civilian governments and their 
administrations are relying increasingly on 
the armed forces to avoid internal insecurity. 
The growth of domestic disorder arising 
from conflicts with the refugees and 
extraordinary illegal migration will further 
add to the dependence of civilian authorities 
on the security forces to maintain law and 
order and controlling the borders. There is 
the concrete threat that the combination of 
weak civilian institutions, the lack of formal 
civilian control mechanisms, and the 
necessity to manage the Rohingyas 
problem is creating a situation in which the 
military top brass is able to gain significant 
decision-making power. In other words, with 
growing domestic threat scenarios the 
military top brass is becoming more 
influential in matters of internal security, law 
enforcement and national defence. In 
addition to that, it might enforce a process 
of strengthening the role (and acceptance) 
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of coercion in governance and political 
decision-making. This might have a 
particularly negative impact on the quality of 
democracy when the elected civilians, 
which are supposed to represent the 
supreme power (the Bangladesh people), 
are not authorising military decision-making 
or able to monitor their implementation. 
More concretely, when the security forces 
are starting to formulate the goals and to 
decide on the methods how to deal with the 
Rohingyas, civilian supremacy is seriously 
challenged. This would define a crucial 
challenge towards any processes of 
democratic consolidation. Having this in 
mind, one must state that the reports of 
numerous human rights violations 
accompanied by activities of the regular and 
paramilitary security forces and the 
respective impunity of these actions are 
pointing at tensions between civilians and 
military and the unstable state of 
democracy. Furthermore, besides producing 
democratic defects, there are indications 
that security orientated approaches of 
conflict solutions (unauthorised as well 
authorised) by Bangladeshi soldiers add to 
an enhancement of tensions between state 
and refugees. Undoubtedly, military 
strategies are in nature much more robust 
than those of civilian forces. In order to 
keep the refugees separate from the local 
communities by gathering them in camps 
with registration, to avoid unmonitored and 
uncontrolled ‘self-settlement’, or deny 
Rohingyas entrance in Bangladesh the use 
of coercive force seems to be rather the 
norm then the exception. The subsequent 
level of frustration among the refugees (and 
local communities) is even more rising by 
observing that the build-up of infrastructure 
in the area of operation is predominantly 
serving security rather than development 
purposes. Consequently, the Rohingyas are 
bound to become more desperate and 
militant to safeguard their interests which 
will find its expression in a strengthened 
position of the radicalised elements. In sum, 
the Rohingyas crisis creates a ‘vicious 
circle’ which will lead to a deterioration of 
the security situation and thereby the quality 
of democracy at both the regional and 
national level.    
Another political dimension of the 
Rohingyas crisis is its negative impact on 
political competition and contestation. 
Basically Bangladesh politics since the 
country came into existence can be 
characterized by an unrestricted zero-sum-
game over political power, leading to a ‘dog-
eat-dog culture’ among the country’s 
politicians and political parties. This style of 
leadership trickled down through the 
different layers of state and society affecting 
all spheres of public life. In result, political 
actors are using all kind of opportunities to 
outbid potential rivals for power. In the given 
context, local politicians and their respective 
parties are trying to use the Rohingyas for 
their partisan political interests. One of the 
most prominent examples is that certain 
politicians with the help of local authorities 
are supporting Rohingyas (through illegal 
measures) to enrol themselves in respective 
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voters lists. In order to do so, the very same 
influential political-administrative nexus is 
providing Rohingyas with false nationality 
certificates like Bangladeshi birth 
certificates, national identity cards and 
passports. There is no doubt that local 
political leaders are keen on fortifying their 
vote banks with the Rohingyas. This is 
generating new and enhancing existing 
inequalities when it comes to ensuring free 
and fair electoral process. The main 
argument made here is that getting the 
illegal migrants enrolled is not only a 
criminal activity but also constitutes severe 
disturbances of equal opportunities 
regarding political competition and 
contestation. Latter phenomenon is 
favouring candidates with more influence 
and financial resources. However, besides 
severe efforts of Bangladesh‘s Elections 
Commission, which for example sets up a 
Special Committee to clear the voters list 
from non-Bangladeshi citizen, analysts are 
stating that there are still thousands of 
enrolled Rohingyas.  
Furthermore, it is argued that the refugees 
are an extremely economic but also 
additional administrative burden for the 
country’s weak institutions. As such, it is 
inducing more ‘favourable moments’ for 
corruption among Bangladesh authorities. 
For example, by having the power of 
granting Rohingyas refugees free 
movement, deciding on refugee status and 
official documents among other benefits, 
there is a critical amount of bribery involved 
in undermining the coherence and loyalty of 
the country’s civil service and policing 
efforts. 
 
Fifth, the Rohingyas crisis is a source for 
insecurity and conflict in Bangladesh’s 
international relations. In this context one 
should differentiate between two 
dimensions: The activities of Rohingyas in 
third countries (outside the Bangladesh-
Myanmar area) and the ones in 
Bangladesh. However in both center of 
action one can find severe linkages with 
militant extremism and religious 
fundamentalism. Furthermore, many facets 
of Rohingyas activities are located within a 
criminal/illegal context. Especially the 
involvement of Rohingyas in Transnational 
criminal organisations is worrying. However, 
both dimensions generate serious 
challenges for Dhaka regarding the 
management of its international relations.  
To begin with, one can state that the 
criminal and fundamentalist actions are 
worsening the situation between Rohingyas 
and local communities in the South East 
border region and the GoB. This will 
generate further mistrust in potential up-
coming negotiations over the status of 
Rohingyas as well as sharpen the reaction 
of the state and civil society towards the 
refugees. There is the threat that this might 
reduce the willingness among the 
authorities in Bangladesh and local 
communities to differentiate between 
moderate or radical and registered or 
unregistered Rohingyas. However, such a 
differentiation is necessary in order to 
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create a constructive atmosphere for 
dialogue with moderate segments of the 
Rohingyas. But instead, the alleged links 
between Rohingyas, crime and 
fundamentalism are on the rise. Additionally 
the situation is turning for the worse due to 
the tendency of indicting all Rohingyas 
apriori indicted for the activities of the 
criminal/militant sections among them. 
In this context one has to be aware that 
there are already tensions between 
Rohingyas and host/local communities in 
the context of international development 
support. There is the accusation that aid 
agencies are providing service to 
Rohingyas which are not available for the 
local communities which are also 
desperately in need for the very same 
assistance. Therefore, the image of the 
Rohingyas of being illegal economic 
refugees and criminal is further 
exacerbating (communal) tensions between 
hosts and refugees. Here, the ban of 
activities of aid organizations because they 
would encourage an influx of Rohingyas 
refugees is not only worrisome form a 
humanitarian perspective but is also 
alienating international donors.  
However, regardless if the Rohingyas 
themselves constitute real or perceived 
threats for the host countries, as long as 
their problem of being stateless refugees 
remains unresolved it will strain 
Bangladesh’s international relations. First of 
all, the Rohingyas-Islamists link is cropping 
up seriously as an irritant in international 
relations. Here one should mention that 
there is the concrete challenge that not only 
the Rohingyas but also state and society of 
Bangladesh are becoming increasingly 
associated with the rise of fundamentalism 
and a hub for transnational criminal 
networks. In this context, one must mention 
that the trafficking (human, drugs, SALW) 
and illegal business like enforcing bonded 
labour or illegal money transfer 
networks/Hundi system) is perceived as a 
destruction of the social harmony in 
neighbouring/third countries suffering from 
Rohingyas criminal actions. For example 
the smuggling of narcotics is increasing the 
rate of drug addicts; the production and/or 
import as well as export of weapons 
produces security risks; and illegal 
Rohingyas workforce and Hundi is 
generating distortion in surrounding 
economies. The fact, that Rohingyas are 
travelling with passports issued by 
Bangladesh authorities based on false 
documents is creating further complications 
between Dhaka and ‘third countries’, 
especially if such elements  challenge the 
law and order situation. This problem 
started increasing  when radicalised 
Rohingyas also started obtaining passports 
and visa in order to engage in ‘critical 
networking and propaganda’ in the 
respective new host states. There are 
indications -for example in Indonesia- that 
these campaigns by radicalized Rohingyas 
have the potential to provoke extremist 
reactions in the targeted countries with 
destabilising impacts for state and society. 
Such activities will not only be 
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deconstructive for the course of the 
Rohingyas but also harmful for Dhaka’s 
bilateral ties with the affected countries. 
Furthermore, there is the perception that the 
GoB is not doing enough to tackle the 
Rohingyas issue and subsequently also 
with the negative side effects -marks 
another irritating determinant for 
international security circles. The fact that 
during the last coalition the government run 
by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 
not only Islamist parties obtained power but 
the state actively promoted Islamic 
fundamentalis, seriously damaging the 
image of Bangladesh as a secular 
democracy. This created an atmosphere of 
fear and anxiety among Buddhist, Hindu, 
Christian, and Ahmadiyya communities far 
beyond the borders of Bangladesh. In 
consequence, the international community 
is concerned about the state of human 
rights and religious freedom in Bangladesh. 
Negative consideration might also affect 
Bangladesh’s aid and economic relations 
especially with the EU which is increasingly 
linking economic cooperation with quality of 
democracy and level of obedience towards 
international human rights and labour 
standards, for example GSP (Generalized 
System of Preferences) Plus. 
 
Finally, it seems that at the moment nobody 
either at the regional, national as well as the 
grassroots level in the affected countries is 
committed to resolve the issue of the 
stateless Rohingyas seeking shelter in 
Southern Asia and beyond. However, at a 
time where the governments and 
international/regional organisation like 
United Nations (UN), South Asia 
Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) still do not have the 
political will, the capacities, or the interests 
to work towards a coherent and 
comprehensive political solution for the 
Rohingyas, latter ones are trying to go 
ahead. This is of course a justified 
endeavour but also holds remarkable risks. 
This is gaining significance since it 
becomes clear, that sections of the refugees 
are willing to use illegal and militant means 
to achieve their goals. Especially if such 
undertakings are carried by the militant and 
ideological radicalized sections of the 
Rohingyas. They will obviously not 
approach the moderate mainstream of civil 
societies and charity organisations as well 
as official authorities/institutions abroad in 
order to support the course of a peaceful 
and non-violent resolution. Rather they will 
look for collaboration with like-minded 
elements in South- and South East Asia as 
well as in the Near East. These actions will 
only strengthen the militant extremist and 
religious fundamentalist elements within the 
Rohingyas community. As such, it will 
enhance processes of fragmentations of the 
representation of refugee interests by 
generating a drift between a radical and 
moderate pole. The situation is getting 
worse when it starts to undermine the 
efforts of moderates.  
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In this context the international community 
has to understand that any further 
ignorance of the Rohingyas issue will play 
in the hands of the Islamists. It is also 
significant to realise that due to missing 
efforts to find a political solution for the 
citizenship status, not only the Rohingyas 
community in- and outside the Bangladesh-
Myanmar area getting radicalised but also 
regional extremist groups using this issue 
for promoting terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism. To conclude, the need of 
the hour is that regional governments in 
South and South East Asia identify the 
unsolved Rohingyas problem finally as a 
chance for constructive regional 
cooperation instead of a roadblock for 
further collaboration.   
